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Computer automation has the potential, just starting to be realized, of transforming the
design and operation of markets, and the behaviors of agents trading in them. We dis-
cuss the possibilities for automating markets, presenting a broad conceptual framework
covering resource allocation as well as enabling marketplace services such as search
and transaction execution. One of the most intriguing opportunities is provided by mar-
kets implementing computationally sophisticated negotiation mechanisms, for example
combinatorial auctions. An important theme that emerges from the literature is the cen-
trality of design decisions about matching the domain of goods over which a mechanism
operates to the domain over which agents have preferences. When the match is imper-
fect (as is almost inevitable), the market game induced by the mechanism is analytically
intractable, and the literature provides an incomplete characterization of rational bid-
ding policies. A review of the literature suggests that much of our existing knowledge
comes from computational simulations, including controlled studies of abstract market
designs (e.g., simultaneous ascending auctions), and research tournaments comparing
agent strategies in a variety of market scenarios. An empirical game-theoretic method-
ology combines the advantages of simulation, agent-based modeling, and statistical and
game-theoretic analysis.
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Many digitally mediated activities present participants with complex strategic decisions,
involving significant interaction with other agents. The strategic dimension of elec-
tronic commerce, for instance, is obvious, not just for negotiation and trading, but also
for ancillary commerce operations such as matchmaking, resource finding, advertising,
recommendation, contracting, and executing transactions. All of these are increasingly
subject to automation as part of online marketplaces [Wellman (2004)]. Other digital
realms, not necessarily viewed as commerce per se, nevertheless involve pivotal strate-
gic relationships. Examples include peer-to-peer resource sharing [Golle et al. (2001);
Cox and Noble (2003)], formation of coalitions, teams, or affinity groups [Brooks
and Durfee (2003); Sandholm and Lesser (1997); Tambe (1997)], scientific sharing
of large-scale instrumentation and other infrastructure [Finholt and Olson (1997);
Finholt (2003)], and coordination of activity within organizations [Malone (1987);
Pynadath and Tambe (2002)].
There are a variety of possible benefits from automating markets. One is cost saving
from automating some functions of existing non-computational markets. For example,
search automation reduces the cost of finding goods and potential trading partners. Mi-
cropayment systems offer the hope—not yet fully realized—of enabling large volumes
of remote, low-value transactions by reducing the execution overhead. Another benefit
is the ability to extend markets in time and geographic scope by conducting them over
networks. For example, eBay’s main innovation is not in the form of its markets, but in
its ability to make markets that bridge time and space.
The greatest disruptive potential may lie in the opportunity to deploy market mech-
anisms that are simply infeasible to operate without computer automation. Creating
previously missing markets enables gains from trade, and the creation of new products
and services, with first-order effects on social welfare. Such mechanisms were dubbed
“smart markets”, apparently by Vernon Smith. For example, a multi-airport landing
slot allocation policy might require the solution of a constrained integer program as
a function of bid messages from participating agents. Such policies are well beyond
the capabilities of non-automated market mediators; in some applications they take
CPU days to solve even with current hardware. The emergence of cheap, high-speed
computation created excitement among market designers, because without automated
computation many interesting allocation mechanisms were infeasible for problems with
real-world scale.
We study issues in the design of automated markets with software agents: how to
automate effectively various components of market transactions? We emphasize design
issues impinging on strategy, and strategic behavior particular to the market setting. Our
chapter complements Marks (2005), who focuses on the use of agent-based computa-
tional techniques as a tool for use in (not necessarily computational) market design.
Thus, Marks emphasizes positive analysis: how we can use agent-based models to
evaluate performance of various market designs. We adopt this perspective briefly in
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Section 5, where we describe a computational game methodology for analyzing agent
strategies and computational market designs.
Given our focus on design, much of the contribution of our chapter to agent-based
computational economics (ACE) is to the development of infrastructure. For ACE mod-
elers to study the implications of various market designs and agent strategies they need
to be able to implement computational representations that are correct, interesting, and
tractable.
To assist in these endeavors, we first present, in Section 2, a conceptual market
design framework. After graphically characterizing the design space for marketplace
systems, we present a brief specification of a formal model that encompasses many of
the interesting problems for market and agent design. The model provides a structured
framework for organizing the literature review in the rest of the chapter.
Section 3 covers the largest body of material. We discuss design issues and imple-
mentation research for mechanisms that provide the three different types of market
transaction services we identified in our conceptual framework: discovery, negotiation
(what is usually, narrowly, called “the market”), and execution. We devote dispro-
portionate attention to negotiation or deal-making market mechanisms, reflecting the
relative attention economists in general give to each of the three stages.
In Section 4 we focus on the other major area for design: trading agents, who interact
through the market mechanisms discussed in Section 3. We consider both theoretical
and practical problems of designing strategies needed to make economically-intelligent
trading agents. We present a case study based on a several-year history of trading agent
competitions that have attracted substantial attention.
We close the chapter by presenting an emerging computational agent-based method-
ology for empirical game-theoretic analysis. This method has been developed to address
a fundamental problem in the design of both trading agent strategies and the mar-
ket mechanisms through which they interact: optimal strategies for complex (realistic)
markets are analytically intractable. We consider empirical game-theoretic analysis a
promising approach for systematic investigation of agent strategies, and then for the
evaluation of market mechanism performance when agents follow successful strategies.
These agent-based methods offer one way to close the loop between the over-simplified
theoretical models of agents and market, and the practical problems that designers must
solve to implement realistic markets.
2. Marketplace design framework
Markets allocate resources through a series of transactions, each an exchange of goods
and services expressed in terms of an underlying monetary system. We find it useful to
organize the life cycle of a transaction into three stages, representing the fundamental
steps that parties must go through in order to conduct trade.
1. Connecting: the search for and discovery of an opportunity to engage in a market
interaction.
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Figure 1. The fundamental steps of a market transaction.
2. Dealing: the negotiation of terms.
3. Exchanging: the execution of the terms of an agreed transaction.
These steps are illustrated in Figure 1. Of course, the boundaries between steps are not
sharp, and these activities may be repeated, partially concluded, retracted, or interleaved
along the way to a complete commercial transaction. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the
three steps is useful as a way to categorize particular resource allocation services, which
tend to focus on one or the other.
Rarely are all of these tasks automated. Only some agents may be automated, and
even then perhaps only partially. Some of the market functions (say, finding connections,
or negotiating deals) may be automated, but not others. Therefore, it is not very useful to
discuss automation of an entire system as a single problem. In this chapter we consider
the components separately, reflecting the complexity of the problem and the division of
labor in the research literature.
2.1. Marketplace systems
To organize our discussion, we present and discuss a schematic representation of the
overall design problem.1 In Figure 2 we embed a marketplace system in an environ-
ment of social institutions (e.g., language, laws, etc.). The marketplace system itself
consists of agents and the market mechanism through which they interact. The market
mechanism can be roughly subdivided into structures, practices, and rules for the tasks
of connecting, dealing, and exchanging. We now offer more precise definitions of the
central concepts, and provide a formal framework within which we analyze them.
Marketplace system The agents who participate in the resource allocation problem,
together with the market mechanisms through which they interact.
Mechanism The rules, practices and social structures of a social choice process, spec-
ifying (1) permissible actions (often limited to messages, expressible as a commu-
nication protocol) and (2) outcomes as a function of agent actions. A mechanism
is mediated if there is some entity, distinct from the participants, that manages the
communication and implements the mechanism rules.
1 The descriptive terms we use do not have standard definitions, so we need to establish our own for these
purposes. For example, some use “market” to refer to what we call a marketplace system. But others use
“market” just for the practices and structures for making deals, excluding the participating agents and the
other activities (such as connecting) from the term.
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Figure 2. Schematic for a marketplace system.
Market mechanism A mechanism where the possible ultimate outcomes comprise
market-based exchange transactions.
Agent An autonomous decision-making locus in a system of multiple decision-making
entities.2 An agent has “type” attributes such as preferences, beliefs, intentions, and
capabilities. Type information is generally considered private, not inherently ac-
cessible to others. For purposes of analysis, we may attribute to agents particular
decision-making rules, or more generally, assume that they conform to some deci-
sion rule, specifying a form of consistency between the agent’s behavior, beliefs and
preferences. Such attributions may appeal to classical notions of rationality, as well
as alternative bounded or otherwise nonstandard coherence criteria.
Our characterization of a marketplace system indicates that there is not just one
design problem, but several. The first is design of the market mechanism, for use by
human (undesigned), or computational (designed) agents. The market mechanism may
be decomposed into several design subproblems: for example, mechanisms typically
are designed separately for the connection, deal and exchange phases of a transaction.
The second top-level problem is design of agents to interact (perhaps with human assis-
tance) with existing market mechanisms, or with new mechanisms designed by others.
In some situations one might be in a position to design an entire marketplace system,
though we consider this unusual.
In this chapter, we focus on market mechanism design in Section 3, devoting most of
our attention to the deal negotiation task. We also provide a brief discussion of automat-
ing the connecting and exchanging functions. We address agent design in Section 4.
2 For purposes of framing the general design problem, we apply the term agent generically to humans,
computational processes, or organizations as long as they exhibit agent characteristics.
hescom v.2005/11/24 Prn:23/12/2005; 9:40 F:hescom2028.tex; VTEX/Judita p. 7
aid: 2028 pii: S1574-0021(05)02028-9 docsubty: REV













































We present a formal model of a marketplace system to focus attention on the important
design issues that we review the rest of the chapter. The formal representation is not
essential to understand the rest of the chapter, but it provides a concise organization
of the main themes. This representation also implicitly suggests (we do not provide
extensive references) the links between the topics we cover and the more theoretical
literature on mechanism design that we do not review in detail.
Marketplaces can be designed for transactions in goods, services, tasks, plans or
other resources and activities. For simplicity, we will refer to these state variables as
goods, and represent them as a vector of quantities that takes values from a domain X.
Given N total agents, an allocation is an assignment of a matrix x ∈ XN to agents
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, with the individual allocation vector to each agent denoted by xi ∈ X.
A market mechanism specifies (1) the goods it recognizes, and (2) rules for deter-
mining allocation outcomes. There are typically two types of rules: those specifying
a set of permissible actions (strategies), si ∈ Si for each agent i, and procedures
for choosing an allocation based on the observable actions. We denote a mecha-
nism by γ = (s1, . . . , sN , g(·)), where g maps the set of actions into allocations,
g : S1 × · · · × SN → XN . We denote the allocation this mechanism makes to a spe-
cific agent by gi(s) = xi . An example of the rules governing allowable strategies is the
set of bidding rules in an ascending auction (for example, bids must be over single lots,
and must exceed the previous bid by at least some specified increment). An example of
an allocation rule is the English auction rule for unitary objects (the high bidder wins
the object, and pays her announced bid).
When a market mechanism is designed, the designer presumably wishes to fulfill
some objective subject to various constraints. Let θ be the information state across
all agents, defined on the Cartesian product of the individual information spaces i .
Typically the objective can be expressed as a function (often called a social choice
function) that maps from the information state of the agents to a preferred allocation,
as f : 1 × · · · × N → XN . However, since elements of the θi are private to the
agents, and thus not directly accessible to the designer, the ability to achieve this ob-
jective depends on the extent to which agents choose to reveal this information, and the
cost to the mediator of inducing revelation. Further, the space of possible mechanisms
may be constrained by additional social restrictions such as “no external subsidies”, or
“maintain horizontal equity”, which taken together restrict the set of allocations to some
permissible space, f (θ) ∈ F .
Agents are distinguished by their possession of private information and autonomy.
We let θi denote agent i’s private information, which can be taken to include all of the
agent’s relevant knowledge of or beliefs about states of the world. This information is
private in the sense that other agents j do not generally have access to all of the infor-
mation in the set θi . An agent is autonomous if it exhibits preferences over allocations,
and chooses actions according to some decision rule. Assume that i’s preferences can be
represented by a real-valued function ui(xi, θi), called agent i’s utility for a given alloca-
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tion xi given its private information, which has the property that ui(x′i , θi) > ui(xi, θi)
exactly when i prefers allocation x′i to xi .
An autonomous agent maps its preferences into actions according to decisions that
follow from its decision rule. For example, the canonical decision rule assumed by
economists for non-strategic settings is that an agent will select feasible actions that
maximize its (expected) utility. In strategic settings, one commonly assumed decision
rule is that an agent will choose a dominant strategy if one exists. This decision rule
is not complete, because it does not specify what to do when no dominant strategy ex-
ists. There are many more complete decision rules commonly studied in the literature.
For example, every finite game of (incomplete) information has a set of agent strategies
that form a mixed perfect (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium [Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)].3
A corresponding decision rule is that an agent will play a strategy from the Bayes–Nash
set. Unfortunately, this decision rule offers a choice for every (finite) problem, but may
still be incomplete because there may be multiple equilibria, and then it is necessary
to specify which Bayes–Nash strategy to play. A particular computational implementa-
tion of the agent’s decision rule may or may not involve explicit optimization of ui , or
explicit models of beliefs and preferences [Russell and Norvig (2003)].
This formal description of a marketplace system highlights many of the problems
that must be addressed by the designer of an automated system. One crucial thing to re-
member when reading the literature, and when engaging in computational marketplace
design, is that some features will be explicitly designed while others will be unspecified
(and thus taken as found in the environment in which the system is applied). The per-
formance of the system is likely to depend at least as crucially on the features that are
not designed as those that are.
We defined a role for goods, mechanisms and agents. We now use the model to illus-
trate with just a few examples the design issues for these features in turn.
2.2.1. Design and goods
One issue for the designer is which goods the system will recognize, and in partic-
ular whether the domain of the goods a market mechanism allocates corresponds to
the domain of the goods over which agents have preferences. For example, external-
ity problems (such as pollution) have long been characterized as problems of “missing
markets” for certain goods. Some computational markets are designed specifically to
enable allocations of goods that matter to agents but which are not generally traded in
spontaneous (undesigned) markets (see, e.g., Ledyard and Szakaly (1994)). The issue
of which goods to transact is central to the interest in combinatorial mechanisms, which
we discuss below in Section 3.2.2.
3 A Nash equilibrium is one in which each agent is playing a strategy that is a best response to the strategies
of the others: that is, all strategies are mutual best responses. Bayes–Nash equilibrium means that when
information is incomplete, players update their beliefs as new information arrives in the game according to
Bayes’ Rule, and then play Nash strategies with respect to their expectations.
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2.2.2. Designing market mechanisms
An important issue for automated market designers is to decide which of the several
market mechanism features to design, and which to leave unspecified. Recall from
Figure 2 that market transactions require mechanisms for mediating the functions of
connecting, dealing and exchanging. Much of the market mechanism literature focuses
on the dealing function: the determination of terms of trade and the assignment of al-
locations. Even when there is attention to mechanisms for the other functions, the most
common approach is to define for each function as a separate entity; thus in Section 3 we
discuss separately design for each. However, ignoring interactions between the mech-
anisms may result in inefficiencies and failures. We expect that as automated market
design matures we will see increasing attention to mechanisms that integrate more of
these several necessary functions.
Recall also (see Figure 2) that a marketplace system operates in the context of a
problem environment, consisting of technological and institutional constraints. Other
institutions are features of the environment that restrict the set of possible mechanism
designs. In this chapter we treat other institutions and technology as given, and im-
mutable by the designer; e.g., laws, common languages, government structures, CPU
capabilities. The institutions restrict feasible mechanisms to some space, . The design
problem is to configure a feasible mechanism γ ∈ —that is, to define a set of goods
over which agents can deal, rules specifying permissible actions, and rules mapping ac-
tions to allocations—that implements the constrained social choice function f (θ) ∈ F .
Designers of computational markets thus need to either implicitly or explicitly make
assumptions about laws, languages and other social institutions necessary to support
transactions.
2.2.3. Designing agents
We defined agents by their information, preferences and decision rules. Each raises
important design considerations. For example, to predict the performance of a par-
ticular mechanism the designer must make assumptions about the decision rule the
agents will follow when interacting with the mechanism, which in turn depends on
assumptions about agent information and preferences. When building automated agents
themselves, the designer must deal with information acquisition, storage and process-
ing problems (for example, to compute Bayesian updates or other predictions of relevant
events). Designers must endow agents with feasible algorithms to implement their de-
cision rules, which is no small matter in some settings. For example, in many market
mechanisms—such as the ubiquitous multiple simultaneous ascending auctions—it is
generally computationally infeasible to determine Bayes–Nash strategies. We discuss
this problem and a method for analyzing agent strategies for intractable mechanisms in
Section 5.
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2.3. Possibilities and impossibilities
It is often difficult in complex problem environments to find a mechanism that im-
plements the desired objective while satisfying even a few, seemingly reasonable con-
straints on the social choice functions that it implements. Indeed, in very general classes
of problems, no such mechanisms of any sort exist. A considerable body of design the-
ory characterized the space of social choice functions that are possible; this literature
provides crucial guidance for the design of computational markets.
For example, suppose the marketplace designer wants a system that will satisfy the
following rather weak requirements (we use fi(θ) to denote the subset of allocation
f (θ) received by agent i):
1. Ex-post efficiency (Pareto optimality): For no profile θ = {θ1, . . . , θN } ∈ 1 ×
· · · × N is there an x ∈ X such that ui(xi, θi) ≥ ui(fi(θ), θi) for all i, and
ui(xi, θi) > ui(fi(θ), θi) for some i. That is, there is no alternative outcome in
which at least one agent would be better off, and no agent would be worse off.
2. Ex-interim participatory efficiency (individual rationality): Suppose agent i begins
with an endowment of goods, ωi ∈ i , which it keeps if it refrains from partic-
ipating in the mechanism. Then ui(fi(θ), θi) ≥ ui(ωi, θi) for every i. That is,
agents must be willing to voluntarily participate given the rules of the mechanism
and their private knowledge about their own situation (before the final allocation
is revealed).
3. No subsidies: The mechanism does not require any external injection of resources
(e.g., payments to agents) that are not obtainable through the allocation of endow-
ments 1 × · · · × N → X.
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed that in general for a bilateral exchange
problem there is no mechanism that satisfies (1)–(3) (if agents are assumed to use a
Bayes–Nash strategy as their decision rule).4
Given this strong impossibility result, designers must choose ways in which to relax
the design requirements. Three typical approaches are to (1) assume (or impose if un-
der designer control) agent preferences that are more tightly restricted in the space of
rational preferences; (2) assume or impose that agent decision rules are restricted more
narrowly; or (3) relax some of the social choice constraints on an acceptable mechanism.
Two of the more important constructive results are the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves
(VCG) family of social efficiency maximizing mechanisms and the Maskin-Riley rev-
enue maximizing mechanism. In VCG (discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.2, be-
low), agent preferences are restricted to those that can be expressed as quasilinear utility
functions, and the “no subsidies” constraint is abandoned. The Maskin and Riley (1989)
mechanism limits the space of goods, and replaces ex-post efficiency with revenue max-
imization (that is, the social choice function depends on the preferences of only one
agent, the seller).
4 A bit more precisely, the result holds for at least bilateral trade between agents each of whom is au-
tonomous and self-interested, has private information about its own value, satisfies Bayes–Nash rationality,
and for whom the support for those valuations overlap.
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3. Automating market mechanisms
We organize our review on the design of computational market mechanisms to follow
the three stages in our diagram of the canonical transaction problem: discovery, negoti-
ation and execution (see Figure 1).
We focus primarily on computational mechanisms for negotiation, or making the
deal, which is the second of the three steps. This focus largely reflects the bias in the
economics field, which is most relevant for the audience of this book. However, we
think it is important to recognize the plethora of ancillary services that must also be
provided to support trading. Each is potentially subject to automation as well. As agent-
based computational systems mature, we hope to see increasing attention to the design
of mechanisms for connecting and exchanging. These are relatively open-ended prob-
lems, with services often provided by third parties outside the scope of a particular
marketplace, as well as within the marketplace itself.
In the first subsection we provide a brief overview of some discovery facilities to
illustrate some of the opportunities provided by the online medium, as well as require-
ments for operating a successful marketplace. In the second and longest subsection we
discuss in some detail research on the design of computational mechanisms for deal ne-
gotiation (the “market” to many, though we use the term more expansively to describe
all three functions). In the third subsection we survey briefly a few systems to facilitate
transaction execution. The need for additional attention to discovery and execution as
problems of market design should become evident.
3.1. Connecting: discovery services
At a bare minimum, marketplaces must support discovery to the extent of enabling users
to navigate the opportunities available at a site. More powerful discovery services might
include electronic catalogs, keyword-based or hierarchical search facilities, and the like.
The world-wide web precipitated a resurgence in the application of information retrieval
techniques [Belew (2000)], especially those based on keyword queries over large textual
corpora.
Going beyond generic search, industry groups proposed a variety of standards for de-
scribing and accessing goods and services across organizations. Examples include lan-
guages extending XML with commerce-specific constructs [Hofreiter et al. (2002)], and
protocols and registration infrastructure supporting web services [Curbera et al. (2002)].
Some recent proposals suggested using semantic web [Berners-Lee et al. (2001)] tech-
niques to provide matchmaking services based on inference over richer representations
of goods and services offered and demanded [Di Noia et al. (2004), Li and Horrocks
(2004)].
The task of discovering commerce opportunities inspired several innovative ap-
proaches that go beyond matching of descriptions to gather and disseminate information
relevant to comparing and evaluating commerce opportunities. Here we merely enumer-
ate some of the important service categories:
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[Resnick and Varian (1997), Schafer et al. (2001)]. Automatic recommender systems
suggest commerce opportunities (typically products and services to consumers) based
on prior user actions and a model of user preferences. Often this model is derived from
cross-similarities among activity profiles across a collection of users, in which case it is
termed collaborative filtering [Resnick et al., 1994; Hill et al., 1995; Riedl and Konstan,
2002]. A familiar example of collaborative filtering is Amazon.com’s “customers who
bought” feature.
3.1.2. Reputation
When unfamiliar parties consider a transaction with each other, third-party information
bearing on their reliability can be instrumental in establishing sufficient trust to proceed.
In particular, for person-to-person marketplaces, the majority of exchanges represent
one-time interactions between a particular buyer and seller.
Reputation systems [Dellarocas (2003), Resnick et al. (2002)] fill this need by ag-
gregating and disseminating subjective reports on transaction results across a trading
community. One of the most prominent examples of a reputation system is eBay’s
“Feedback Forum” [Cohen (2002), Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002)], which some credit
significantly for eBay’s ability to achieve a critical-mass network of traders.
3.1.3. Comparison shopping
The ability to obtain deal information from a particular marketplaces suggests an oppor-
tunity to collect and compare offerings across multiple marketplaces. The emergence on
the web of price comparison services followed soon on the heels of the proliferation of
searchable retail web sites. One early example was BargainFinder [Krulwich (1996)],
which compared prices for music CDs available across nine retail web sites. The Uni-
versity of Washington ShopBot [Doorenbos et al. (1997)] demonstrated the ability to
automatically learn how to search various sites, exploiting known information about
products and regularity of retail site organization. Subsequent research systems em-
phasized issues such as adaptivity to user preferences [Menczer et al. (2002)]. Today’s
shopping engines employ direct data feeds from product vendors, and provide standard
interfaces with typically price-based product rankings.
3.1.4. Auction aggregation
The usefulness of comparison shopping for fixed-price offerings suggested that sim-
ilar techniques might be applicable to auction sites. Such information services might
be even more valuable in a dynamically priced setting, as there is typically greater in-
herent uncertainty about the prevailing terms. The problem is also more challenging,
however, as auction listings are often idiosyncratic, thus making it difficult to recognize
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all correspondences. Nevertheless, several auction aggregation services (BidFind, Auc-
tionRover, and others) launched in the late 1990s. Concentration in the online auction
industry and resistance from auction sites has combined with the difficulty of delivering
reliable information to limit the usefulness of such services, however, and relatively few
are operating today.
3.2. Dealing: negotiation mechanisms
Negotiations are the major component of many computational market institutions (see
Figure 2), and probably the component that received the most research attention. We
use the word “negotiation” to refer to any process through which potential traders come
to agreement on the terms of a deal. This includes a range of practices, from two agents
haggling over price in a bazaar to a standard retail transaction in which the selling agent
posts a fixed price and the buying agent says either “yes” or “no”.
Computational negotiation mechanisms often involve a mediator: an entity that col-
lects offer messages from the potential traders, and facilitates the mapping of those
messages into an outcome. Well-known non-computational examples include an auc-
tioneer and a market maker on a stock exchange floor. Auction web sites such as
eBay are the best known examples of mediation in computational markets. In general
a mediator may have a stake in the outcome (e.g., as party to transactions, or through
commissions), in which case it also plays the role of an agent. However, to sharpen the
distinction we maintain a strict separation between the agent and mediator roles, mod-
eling the latter as following a fixed policy determined by the mechanism designer. For
example, an eBay auction is mediated by the process that receives and validates bids,
following the specified eBay rules for showing the current high bid, and determining
the final winner and price.
In this section we discuss research on the design of mediated computational negoti-
ation mechanisms. We start with a review of designs (and some implementations) for a
smorgåsbord of domain-specific applications, ranging from computer file systems to en-
ergy markets to belief aggregation. We describe the main goals, assumptions and some
results, without attempting to be comprehensive or exhaustive. We selected applications
areas because they are significant in the historical development of thought in this area,
or because they received intensive research attention in recent years.
We then turn to the large body of recent work that focuses on mostly technical
questions arising from the design of an important class of computational markets: com-
binatorial mechanisms. We give extra attention to this particular area of the market
design theory literature because it emerged from important real market design appli-
cations (most notably public spectrum auction), it attracted the attention of many top
researchers in both economics and computer science, and it represents an important
area at the current leading edge of research. Further, many of the problems that arise in
other settings are similar to those in combinatorial markets, so it is a good representative
for other bodies of literature we have insufficient space to review.
hescom v.2005/11/24 Prn:23/12/2005; 9:40 F:hescom2028.tex; VTEX/Judita p. 14
aid: 2028 pii: S1574-0021(05)02028-9 docsubty: REV












































3.2.1. Smart markets for domain-specific applications
There are many computational markets in use. Most research, with some exceptions,
concerned designs that have not (yet) been implemented. One important exception has
been a recent surge in matching markets for solving various social problems. The best
known is the medical resident matching market in the U.S. [Roth and Peranson (1999)].
Related field work is underway, though not yet complete, for markets to match pairs
of potential kidney donors [Roth et al. (2005)] and to match students to public schools
[Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2005)]. More often, due to the high cost of implementing test
markets, empirical research to evaluate performance is carried out through human sub-
ject laboratory experiments on stylized instances of the designs, or through numerical
computer simulations.
In the remainder of this section we discuss a number of computational negotiation
mechanisms—only some of which have been implemented in the field—designed for
specific domains. We call these “smart markets”, following Vernon Smith [McCabe et
al. (1991)], because nearly all of these mechanisms involve a nontrivial computation
on submitted offer messages to determine the outcome. Thus, we do not discuss the
negotiation mechanisms that underlie markets such as eBay, because they are simple
enough to not require any special computational capabilities. Indeed, such negotiation
mechanisms are notable for mimicking non-computational auctions and other market
forms that have been common for centuries.5
3.2.1.1. Allocating computational and communication network resources Given that
computer scientists directly confront allocation problems involving computational re-
sources (e.g., sharing bandwidth, CPU cycles, file space), it is perhaps unsurprising
that much research in computational market mechanisms has targeted such problems.
This reflexive phenomenon has been important for development of the research commu-
nity. Over time, a number gravitated towards principles from economics: the discipline
most focused on the analysis of resource allocation questions. More or less contempora-
neously, economists interested in computationally-intensive mechanisms began picking
up ideas from computational science. Mechanism design for network and computational
resources became an early meeting ground for economists and computer scientists, and
much of the research began to exhibit cross-disciplinary approaches, often supported
by cross-disciplinary collaboration. These early efforts resulted in important learning
about the interaction between incentives theory and computational method that in-
formed much of the more recent negotiation design research in other domains.
Several computer scientists in the 1980s focused on the possibility of applying
market-mediated transactions to allocate computational resources.6 These projects drew
5 Other features of eBay and similar online auctions, such as search facilities and reputation management,
do make innovative use of Instead, we focus on negotiation mechanisms that for the most part are infeasible
to operate without computer automation.
6 Ironically, an early market for time-sharing computer resources was implemented at Harvard without com-
putational support, with bids and schedules posted by hand on a bulletin board [Sutherland (1968)].
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attention to the problem of defining the goods over which a computational market
negotiates. There are many levels of abstraction and aggregation at which computing
resources and services could be specified; to create an automated market it is necessary
to explicitly specify the set of goods. Among these early studies were investigations of
the problems of specifying markets for file space [Kurose and Simha (1989)], commu-
nications channels [Kurose and Simha (1986)], and CPU loads [Ferguson et al. (1988)].
In a novel approach to allocating scarce computing resources, Brewer (1999) pro-
poses a “computation procuring clock auction” which addresses the challenge at the
level of a market for problem solutions, rather than a market for problem-solving re-
sources. In Brewer’s mechanism a mediator poses a computationally costly problem and
agents offer approximate solutions. Thus, the computational market effectively creates
a decentralized “computer” out of the participating agents. At any instant the market
displays the current best solution to the problem of interest. Agents can then submit
improved solutions; they are paid some fraction of the improvement in the objective
function. The auction ends when a defined interval passes without new solution submis-
sions. Brewer obtained positive results in human subject experiments, using a complex
train scheduling from another smart market as the problem to be solved.
The academic research Internet rapidly grew and made the transition to the commer-
cial Internet in the early 1990s. For several years, usage (traffic) doubled approximately
annually, outstripping (physical and technical) increases in the network. Congestion be-
came a significant problem, and engineers were concerned that with continued growth
the Internet would collapse. From these conditions emerged a quite large literature on
designing computational markets for allocating bandwidth. The early work focused on
characterizing the economics of bandwidth congestion and the potential benefits from
a designed market [Cocchi et al. (1993), Shenker (1994), MacKie-Mason and Var-
ian (1994a, 1995a)]. Congestion is an externality: that is, a given user putting a load
on the network does not directly bear the cost of additional congestion experienced
by others. Thus in general the allocation of bandwidth resources by a market will be
inefficient unless the market is specifically designed to internalize the congestion exter-
nality.
Internet traffic is transported using packet-switching; by contrast, voice networks
switch circuits. MacKie-Mason and Varian (1994a, 1995b, 1996) explored the implica-
tions of the Internet’s architecture for good market design, and proposed a mechanism
designed specifically for packet networks that would allocate congested bandwidth to
packets. Their mechanism charges a positive price for packets when there is congestion
(and zero otherwise), respects agents’ autonomy and private information, and obtains an
efficient allocation despite the congestion externality. This mechanism is a smart mar-
ket that necessarily depends on a high degree of automation to process agent messages,
determine the allocation, and implement the allocation. This computational market is a
Generalized Vickrey Auction [MacKie-Mason and Varian (1994b)], which is a feasible
instance of a Vickrey–Clark–Groves (VCG) mechanism designed specifically to handle
externalities. This is the first proposal for a VCG mechanism we have found for com-
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putational markets; the later literature on combinatorial markets extensively explores
VCG mechanisms, as we discuss below.
Other mechanisms proposed for congestion priority allocation include [Cocchi et al.
(1993), Gupta et al. (1996), Korilis et al. (1995)]. These and the Generalized Vickrey
Auction have various difficulties with the matching of the domain of allocations offered
in the market to the domain of agent preferences. Some proposed mechanisms are spe-
cific to allocating packets, but generally users have preferences defined over sessions
or flows with many (sometimes many thousand) packets. Further, all of these proposals
were for static allocation markets, but user preferences generally encompass schedule
and other time dependencies.
Well over one hundred papers were published about computational markets for net-
work bandwidth in the ensuing decade. One important topic addressed early was the
design of markets to allocate multiple qualities of service (rather than merely conges-
tion priority); see, e.g., [Cocchi et al. (1991), Shenker (1995), MacKie-Mason et al.
(1996b)]. Mechanisms were designed for networks with virtual circuits [MacKie-Mason
et al. (1996a), Thomas et al. (2002), Kelly et al. (1998)].7 Others developed compu-
tational mechanisms for cost-sharing network services that generate joint costs, such
as multi-casting [Moulin and Shenker (2001), Feigenbaum et al. (2001)]. Chen (2003)
tested some of these mechanisms with human subjects. Some work addressed additional
problems that arise in markets for network services that support mobile users [Mullen
and Breese (1998)]. Recent work in “distributed algorithmic mechanism design” ob-
tains results for a mechanism to assign interdomain routing that is constrained to be
backwards compatible with existing Internet communication protocols [Feigenbaum et
al. (2005)].
Recently there has been renewed interest in computational markets for other com-
putational resources. In particular, in the late 1990s several authors explored markets
for CPU resources. This research responded to the observation that most CPU cycles
available from desktop computers and workstations are unused. For a price, computer
owners might be willing to let others run programs on their machines. Researchers ex-
plored market designs for CPU markets on networks of workstations [Amir et al. (2000),
Gagliano et al. (1995), Waldspurger et al. (1992)], as well as the broader Internet [Amir
et al. (1998), Regev and Nisan (1998)]. Recent work introduced market models for peer-
to-peer [Gupta and Somani (2004), Cox and Noble (2003)] and grid computing [Wolski
et al. (2001)].
The other significant strand of computational market design for computational re-
sources focused on providing file system services. Specific applications include markets
for distributed databases [Stonebraker et al. (1996)]; Web servers and web caching
[Karaul et al. (1998), Kelly et al. (1999, 2005)]; and data replication [Anastadiadi et
al. (1998)].
7 Virtual circuits are a blend of packet- and circuit-switching technology of which asynchronous transfer
mode (ATM) is the best known example.
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3.2.1.2. Energy markets Computational mechanisms have been employed for elec-
tric generation in England, California, France, New England, and other locations. In
an important study, given the paucity of empirical evaluations of implemented markets,
Wolfram (1998) studies the behavior of (non-automated) bidders in the automated daily
generating capacity auction in England. This is a multi-unit uniform-price mechanism;
Wolfram finds that bidders strategically manipulate their bids in accordance with the-
oretical predictions about this mechanism design, resulting in less than optimal social
efficiency. Cameron and Cramton (1999) analyze some of the institutional details of
market implementations in California, and their implication for efficiency. Nicolaisen
et al. (2001) develop a simulation model of electricity markets, relating efficiency and
market power to mechanism microstructure. Ygge and Akkermans (1996) design a com-
putational market mechanism for power load management, where agents representing
individual devices present demands, responding competitively to price changes. See
Marks (2005) for an extended discussion of agent-based simulation models applied to
energy markets.
A joint market for natural gas supplies and transportation was designed and evaluated
with human subject experiments by McCabe et al. (1989). The market calls for sealed,
one-shot bids. Wholesale buyers and wellhead producers submit location-specific of-
fers, and pipeline owners submit link-specific capacity offers. The smart market solves
a linear programming problem for the network, sets uniform prices and assigns a consis-
tent allocation of gas and transport that maximizes social surplus (given the constraints
of the market design). In experiments the market achieved 90% or higher efficiency, and
marginal bids were approximately truthful (thus fulfilling a price discovery role). How-
ever, inframarginal bids were substantially below truth values, and the authors point out
that the theoretical literature predicts an equilibrium for this market that is not truth-
revealing and thus is less than fully efficient.
3.2.1.3. Scheduling Resource allocation with time contingencies is known as a
scheduling problem. There is a huge research literature on the centralized solution of
scheduling problems. A simple keyword search yields over 1500 references, covering
many varieties of scheduling problems distinguished by constraints, objectives, and in-
formation available. Recently a few authors have started to develop market solutions to
scheduling problems, addressing the decentralized structure of many scheduling envi-
ronments.
In traditional scheduling problems, agents submit their bids for time-indexed re-
sources in advance, the mediator applies the mechanism allocation function, and the
schedule is announced, then implemented [Nisan and Ronen (2001)]. Time dependen-
cies almost always lead to complementarities in preferences; Wellman et al. (2001a)
analytically compare three designs along a spectrum of matching the domain of al-
locations to the domain of preferences (separate markets, restricted package markets,
and fully combinatorial VCG mechanism). Train scheduling is one application for
which specific markets have been designed and tested (with human subject experiments)
[Brewer and Plott (1996, 2002)].
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Another interesting category for computational markets contains online scheduling
problems: the inputs arrive sequentially, and allocations are made dynamically, before
all of the inputs are known. At any given moment there is a set of jobs that want to
use the resource. One difference from offline scheduling is that some or all of the re-
source may already be in use, facing the mediator with a decision whether to pre-empt
a running task. Another difference is that new bids for service may arrive in the future,
creating an option cost of committing current resources to current job requests.
Online scheduling problems highlight a problem caused by uncertainty. The eco-
nomic objective in an online problem usually involves some sort of expected value
maximization. In deterministic problems, it is relatively straightforward to evaluate the
performance of a particular allocation rule given the agents’ (static) private informa-
tion. With uncertainty, the outcome also depends on the future evolution of these state
variables. Some of these stochastic processes themselves may be endogenous to the
problem: for example, the arrival of new requests may depend on the current allocation
decisions by the mediator. This only complicates what is already typically an intractable
(NP-hard) optimization problem.
Due to the complexity, there are few results on markets that maximize expected
value for online scheduling problems. The smart markets proposed typically imple-
ment heuristic allocation rules, for instance pre-empting a currently running job if a
new request has an estimated expected value greater than some threshold. Two recent
contributions provide some hope for traditional mechanism designs (that maximize a
social objective function) in online scheduling problems. Friedman and Parkes (2003)
define a class of problems for which a “delayed Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism”
has a dominant strategy equilibrium. Parkes and Singh (2003) show that an online mech-
anism design problem can be formulated and solved as a Markov Decision Process
(MDP) problem, and they define a mechanism in which there is an approximately effi-
cient (though computationally intractable) Bayes–Nash equilibrium.
Most of the online scheduling literature has avoided the complexity problems by
focusing on minimax optimization, that is, reaching lower bounds for worst case per-
formance. Two teams established that the best ratio achievable for worst case on-
line scheduling performance (in centralized (non-strategic) problems) relative to full-
information (offline) scheduling is (1 + √k)2, where k is the maximum ratio between
the value per time unit of any two jobs [Baruah et al., 1992; Koren and Shasha, 1995].
These authors also provide algorithms that reach these bounds. Two recent approaches
construct market solutions for strategic agents. In one the worst case ratio is increased to
only ((1+√k)2 +1) [Porter (2004)]; the other addresses a somewhat different question,
but also provides constructive results [Hajiaghayi et al. (2004)].
3.2.1.4. Belief discovery and aggregation One of the benefits of market allocations is
the discovery of value information. Of particular interest, markets for securities whose
value depends on the future realization of a random variable will aggregate beliefs about
the outcome, and thus provide a predictor. For example, it has long been known that
well-functioning financial markets provide excellent predictors of the underlying asset
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values [Forsythe and Lundholm (1990), Plott and Sunder (1988)]. Forsythe et al. (1992)
implemented and studied the long-running Iowa Electronic Market, in which agents bid
for securities that pay off on the results of political events (e.g., presidential primaries)
and other well-defined events such as corporate earnings announcements. This market
has routinely forecast political outcomes more accurately than professional polling or-
ganizations.
Standard financial markets introduce independent auctions for each security, which
presents scaling problems when there are a large number of uncertain propositions.
Pennock and Wellman (2000) establish conditions under which probabilistic depen-
dence structure can or cannot reduce the number of securities needed for an opera-
tionally complete market. Hanson (2003) addresses the problem by defining a hybrid
between pure markets and the evaluation methods sometimes used to score proba-
bility assessors. His market scoring rules exhibit properties of a market when there
exists sufficient activity, reverting to the properties of scoring rules in cases of low
liquidity. This market was implemented as a DARPA experiment to aggregate public
information relevant to national security concerns [Polk et al. (2003)], but days before
trading began it was halted due to political uproar. Inspired by market scoring rules,
Pennock (2004) introduced a dynamic pari-mutuel market for information aggregation
that exhibits guaranteed liquidity, no risk to the mediator, and continuous updating of
information.
3.2.2. Combinatorial markets
3.2.2.1. Problems with complementarities Complementarities in demand are one of
the more common causes, at least in the research literature, for the complexity that calls
for smart markets. Goods are complements when acquisition of one increases demand
for the other. In such a case, an agent’s willingness to pay for one good will depend
on whether or not the other can also be obtained. Many problems have this feature. For
example, a take-off slot is worth little if the airline cannot also secure a landing slot.
One hour of job-shop time may be worth zero if the firm cannot obtain the second hour
necessary to complete the job. Fast delivery of the first packet in a file or email delivery
is worth little if the remaining packets are delayed.
When goods are complements, a standard competitive price equilibrium may not exist
[Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997)].8 Even when one does, standard price-formation
protocols are not guaranteed to find it [Scarf (1973)]. The fundamental problem is that
when markets operate by separately forming prices for each good, agents cannot directly
express information concerning value complementarities. Using the language from our
conceptual framework, the domain of goods allocated by the mechanism does not match
the domain of goods over which agents have preferences. For example, consider two
8 A “standard” competitive price equilibrium is a vector of unit prices and corresponding feasible allocation
such that each agent receives the quantities it desires taking these prices as given.
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simultaneous sealed-bid auctions, one each for goods A and B. An agent who jointly
values the goods at $3, but who values each separately at $0, might be willing to pay
$1 for good A if it can also purchase good B for no more than $2, but not otherwise.
However, in this auction market the agent can bid for A at $1, but cannot ensure that if
it wins it can simultaneously purchase B for $2 or less.
A direct response to this mismatch between the agent’s preference domain and mech-
anism’s allocation domain is to design mechanisms that allocate a domain of goods
better aligned with agent the domain of agent preferences. Many authors pursue this
through the design of combinatorial mechanisms.
Aligning the scopes of mechanism allocations and agent preferences does not, it
turns out, solve the design problem. There are two types of difficulties. First, as shown
by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), for a surprisingly broad set of problems, it
is impossible to design mechanisms that satisfy minimally desirable constraint sets.
Then, though all else equal some combinatorial mechanisms may outperform non-
combinatorial options, the problem remains of choosing among the possible second-best
combinatorial mechanisms, which may be unbounded in number. The second difficulty
is that all else is not equal: when we take into account the computational and other costs
of combinatorial mechanisms, non-combinatorial mechanisms may better achieve the
designer’s objective. We shall discuss these two problems, and then some highlights of
the literature that developed around them.
The first problem is that in a broad class of problems there exists no Bayesian–Nash
mechanism that is efficient, individually rational, and budget balanced (see Section 2),
but generally two of these can be satisfied at the expense of the third. Therefore, de-
signers typically choose which property to sacrifice, and then try to limit loss on that
dimension. As an alternative, a designer might give up one of these criteria but offer a
mechanism that satisfies the other two plus some other desiderata. Thus, the intuition
to design combinatorial mechanisms when agents exhibit complementary preferences
is only the first search step through a vast design space: the quality of a design depends
in a strong way on the designer’s objective and desired constraints. There may be many
or zero combinatorial mechanisms that are best.
The second problem is that mechanisms implemented for actual use inevitably incur
transaction, computation, and cognitive costs that are often ignored in theoretical analy-
ses. Computational costs include most directly the complexity of solving combinatorial
optimization problems, but also the communication complexity of transmitting offers
over many possible bundles. Cognitive costs include the burden of constructing offers
over such bundles. Transaction costs include delays, coordination effort, and other costs
of addressing multi-dimensional allocation domains in a single overarching mechanism.
These implementation costs create standard economic tradeoffs (largely ignored by
mechanism design economists) between the advantages of combinatorial mechanisms
and their inherent diseconomies of scope. The potential benefits of aligning mechanism
allocation domains with agent preference domains, along with the computational chal-
lenges, motivated a surge in mechanism design research by computer scientists [Dash
et al. (2003), Nisan and Ronen (2001), Papadimitriou (2001), Rosenschein and Zlotkin
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(1994)]. This line of work has begun to address some of these additional costs, however
we are unaware of any work that presents a reasonably complete and explicit model of
the overall design tradeoffs.
3.2.2.2. Combinatorial market design A combinatorial auction specifies rules for per-
missible messages that express values over combinations of goods, and an allocation
function over these messages that assigns combinations. See de Vries and Vohra (2003)
for a good survey; Cramton et al. (2005) collect articles by many of the leading re-
searchers on this topic, presenting an in-depth review of technical issues. We can only
briefly introduce this huge literature. We highlight crucial issues for computational mar-
ket design and open research questions.
Combinatorial mechanisms are motivated in part by the Arrow–Debreu theorem,
which establishes that if markets span the complete domain of agent preferences, a
competitive equilibrium exists and is efficient [Arrow (1964), Debreu (1954)]. How-
ever, a full set of Arrow–Debreu markets, including markets for all bundles of interest
to agents, is not sufficient for two reasons. First, when preferences exhibit complemen-
tarities, the conditions of the Arrow–Debreu theorem are not met and a competitive
equilibrium may not exist [Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997)]. Second, designers are
often concerned with strategic (non-competitive) situations as well. The most important
motivation for computational market design when agents are strategic is a result due to
Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves: a direct revelation mechanism that guarantees an efficient,
individually rational allocation [Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)]. In a
direct revelation mechanism, agents announce to the mediator their preferences over al-
locations; in the VCG family of mechanisms, the scope of allocations is the same as the
scope of agent preferences. For our discussion of combinatorial mechanisms we focus
on VCG-based mechanisms.9
Based on the number of papers solving implementation design problems for VCG
mechanisms, it might appear that researchers view the VCG as an ideal form. In gen-
eral, it is not. First, VCG does not overcome the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
impossibility result: a VCG mechanism that is guaranteed to be efficient and individu-
ally rational will not in general be budget balanced. Indeed, in bad cases, for N agents
the VCG can require a subsidy on the order of N − 1 times the total surplus of the
final allocation.10 Second, although individual rationality and efficiency is a plausible
9 VCG mechanisms maximize Marshallian social welfare, which is the unweighted sum of surpluses (value
net of any payments) for all buying and selling agents, measured in some common unit such as dollars.
Another common design goal is to maximize the seller’s revenue. Most of the points we make about VCG
mechanisms are qualitatively true for revenue-maximizing mechanisms as well, though of course the details
are different. The literature on revenue maximizing mechanisms over complementary goods is much less
developed than that for VCG mechanisms.
10 Roughly speaking, the VCG pays to each agent the value of the surplus that the agent’s value creates by its
participation in the final allocation. Consider a problem in which the participation of all agents is necessary
for any positive value to be created (a coordination, or joint production problem). In this case, if a total value
of S is created, the VCG pays NS in total, of which only S is financed by the surplus created through the
allocation.
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set of minimally desirable criteria, other criteria may be desirable for some allocation
problems. For example, VCG payments are typically “discriminatory”: different agents
likely make (or receive) different payments for the same allocation. In some settings so-
cial norms or other goals may impose a non-discriminatory constraint.11 Third, there are
substantial concerns about the computational feasibility of VCG mechanisms in mod-
erately complex problems. The practical problems proved to be so numerous, and thus
far, sufficiently intractable, that almost no VCGs are implemented in observed practice.
We now discuss these feasibility concerns.
One computational design issue is the winner determination problem: how to com-
pute the allocation function g(S1, S2, . . . , SN) (see Section 2.2)? For a general combina-
torial problem, the VCG computation requires N − 1 separate solutions of an NP-hard
set-packing problem [Rothkopf et al. (1998)]. Known algorithms for NP-hard prob-
lems have worst-case exponential runtimes: the computational cost effectively doubles
with each additional good.12 One line of research focused on developing algorithms
with good average-case performance on representative problem classes Leyton-Brown,
2003; Sandholm and Suri, 2003]. A second logical approach is to find an algorithm
that is guaranteed to find an approximate solution to the VCG allocation in polynomial
time. However, Nisan and Ronen (2000) demonstrate that approximate (non-optimal)
but polynomial (computationally feasible) VCG-based mechanisms that are truthful
have arbitrarily bad performance in the worst case. Yet a third approach is to impose
sufficient restrictions on agent rationality (or permissible strategies) to enable mecha-
nisms that implement the VCG outcomes exactly with feasible computations [Parkes
and Ungar (2002)]. Another line of research studied problems in which there is a struc-
ture on the space of goods that provides sufficient simplification to make the winner
determination problem tractable [Rothkopf et al. (1998), Wellman et al. (2001a)].
A symmetric problem is that of preference elicitation: extracting value information
from agents without imposing an undue or infeasible burden. Given a fully combina-
torial allocation space, agents must determine and express an exponential number of
valuations. For example, with only 30 distinct goods, there are 2N − 1 (over a billion)
possible bundles for which to bid.
A number of authors investigate the communication complexity of various resource
allocation mechanisms. For a convex economy, the Walrasian mechanism is the unique
individually rational mechanism that is informationally efficient (minimizes the dimen-
sionality of the message space necessary to verify a Pareto efficient allocation) [Jordan
11 Much has been written over the years about the social ethics of discriminatory prices. In practice they are
common: for example, students generally pay less for movie tickets than do their professors. Nonetheless,
non-discriminatory pricing is sometimes imposed, particularly for public projects. For example, in designing
a computational market for the provision of evaluations, such as product reviews, Avery et al. (1999) require
that the same action (timing of an evaluation) must be paid the same price.
12 For example, the FCC simultaneously auctioned 1472 licenses in one 1996 auction. The total number of
possible combinations to consider in a fully combinatorial allocation function would have been 21472 − 1.
hescom v.2005/11/24 Prn:23/12/2005; 9:40 F:hescom2028.tex; VTEX/Judita p. 23
aid: 2028 pii: S1574-0021(05)02028-9 docsubty: REV












































(1982), Hurwicz (1960), Mount and Reiter (1974)].13 Among other things, for an econ-
omy to be convex preferences must be sub-additive (which rules out complementarities
between goods), and continuous (which rules out integer constraints), and thus many in-
teresting problems cannot be treated as convex. Unfortunately, the results are somewhat
negative for non-convex economies. Nisan and Segal (2004) show that any efficient
mechanism must communicate at least as much information as a full revelation of one
agent’s preferences, which will in general be exponential when agents have preferences
over combinations of goods. They further prove that even approximately efficient allo-
cations are hard: To guarantee an improvement over the approximation represented by
selling all of the items as a single bundle requires communication that is exponentially
increasing in the number of goods. This is true in a worst-case analysis, and also in
expectation for at least some probability distributions over agent valuations.
Although the preference elicitation problem is provably hard, a number of authors
have worked on pragmatic approaches to making it manageable for some problems.
For example, some researchers address this problem by designing iterative, or progres-
sive combinatorial auctions [Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), Parkes (1999), Parkes and
Ungar (2000), Wurman and Wellman (2000)], in which agents are expected to bid on
each iteration only on bundles that appear best given the current information. Recently,
some proposed methods based on explicit queries [Conen and Sandholm (2002)], where
agents are asked their values for particular bundles based on the auction’s defined query
policy for its current state. There are a variety of related approaches to the elicita-
tion problem [e.g., Faratin and de Walle (2002), Conen and Sandholm (2001), Parkes
(2004)]. One is to develop bidding languages that are natural and concise for human
agents [Boutilier and Hoos (2001)].
A different approach is to identify special problem classes that require less complete
expressions of preferences. For example, Bikhchandani et al. (2002) focus on settings
where “agents are substitutes”: the contribution to problem value of a group of agents is
more than the sum of their individual contributions. In such cases, agents can describe
their preference over a smaller number of bundles, and communication and computa-
tion are polynomial (requiring the solution of two linear programs). Another class of
examples are problems in which valuations satisfy the gross substitutes property [Kelso
and Crawford (1982)]: a Walrasian equilibrium exists [Gul and Stacchetti (1999)] and
it can be found with polynomial communication [Nisan and Segal (2004)].14
Another pragmatic concern for VCG mechanisms (as well as many others) is their
susceptibility to the often unenforceable assumption that agents do not collude. In our
conceptual framework this assumption is represented by limiting communications to the
links between agents and the mediator (see Figure 2). Specifying mechanism rules that
13 A Walrasian mechanism is one that yields a competitive equilibrium; see footnote 8.
14 Two goods are gross substitutes when the Marshallian demand for one increases as the price of the other
increases. The Marshallian demand is the “ordinary” demand; that is, it reflects how a consumer’s demand
changes with price changes, without any income compensation to hold the consumer’s level of overall utility
constant. See, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
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forbid collusion does not necessarily prevent it. VCG mechanisms perform arbitrarily
badly when agents can collude [Ausubel and Milgrom (2002)]. A related concern is their
vulnerability to “false name” bids (one agent splitting package bids between multiple
pseudonyms to change the allocation or associated payments) [Sakurai et al. (1999)].
Despite the known problems with combinatorial mechanisms, they have been tested
in a number of laboratory experiments in which the space of goods was small enough
for the computations to remain tractable. For example, Rassenti et al. (1982) developed
a sealed-bid combinatorial auction to allocate airport runway time slots. Their specifica-
tion of goods allowed for agents to express preferences over packages of multiple slots
to accommodate complementarities (for example, needing a landing slot to combine
with every take-off slot). They implemented an algorithm to determine the allocation
that maximized system surplus, then awarded packages at prices guaranteed to be no
more than the amounts bid. They tested this smart market negotiation mechanism in a
laboratory setting with cash-motivated human subjects, where it obtained about 10%
higher efficiency than a mechanism of independent auctions for each slot.
NASA funded a team of Caltech economists to study various computational market
designs to allocate payload space, power, and other resources for commercial experi-
ments in the space station program. Banks et al. (1989) report on several designs and
human subject experimental tests of their performance. As in Rassenti et al. (1982), the
designs were driven by the specification of the goods over which negotiations were de-
fined. They addressed problems with multiple resources (space, power), uncertainties
in demand and supply (for example, some shuttle launches are cancelled), unresponsive
supply (no inventories and fixed capacities), and demand indivisibilities. They tested
two smart market negotiation mechanisms: one an iterative approximation to a Vickrey–
Clarke–Groves mechanism, and the second a simpler iterative package bidding process.
Traditional markets averaged only 66% efficiency; the iterative VCG averaged 78%,
and the package bidding mechanism averaged 81% efficiency.
Another Caltech experiment tested a combinatorial design for the FCC spectrum
auctions [Bykowsky et al. (2000)]. The FCC did not use combinatorial markets for
its spectrum auctions despite the well-known complementarities, due to concerns with
computational costs and bidding strategy issues.15
Combinatorial mechanisms directly address the problem we have identified many
times in this chapter: the performance of negotiation mechanisms will depend crucially
on the quality of the match between the mechanism’s domain of goods and the domain
of agent preferences. To date few combinatorial mechanisms have been implemented,
but the very active research on each of the design problems we identify offers hope that
this approach to computational negotiation will become more usable in the future.
15 We discuss the FCC auctions further in Section 4.3.2 below, when we address agent bidding strategies for
simultaneous ascending auctions.
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3.3. Exchanging: Transaction services
Once a deal is negotiated, it remains for the parties to execute the agreed-upon exchange.
Many online marketplaces support transaction services to some extent, recognizing that
integrating “back-end” functions—such as logistics, fulfillment, and settlement—can
reduce overall transaction costs and enhance the overall value of a marketplace [Woods
(2002)].
A critical component of market-based exchange, of course, is payment, the actual
transfer of money as part of an overall transaction. The online medium enables the
automation of payment in new ways, and indeed, the 1990s saw the introduction of
many novel electronic payment mechanisms [O’Mahony et al. (1997)], offering a variety
of interesting features [MacKie-Mason and White (1997)], including many not available
in conventional financial clearing systems. For example, some of the schemes supported
anonymity [Chaum (1992)], micropayments [Manasse (1995)], or atomic exchange of
digital goods with payment [Sirbu and Tygar (1995)].
As it turned out, none of the innovative electronic payment mechanisms really caught
on. There are several plausible explanations [Crocker (1999)], including inconvenience
of special-purpose software, network effects (i.e., the need to achieve a critical mass
of buyers and sellers), the rise of advertising-supported Internet content, and decreases
in credit-card processing fees. Nevertheless, some new payment services proved com-
plementary with marketplace functions, and thrived. The most well-known example is
PayPal, which became extremely popular among buyers and sellers in person-to-person
auctions, who benefited greatly from simple third-party payment services. PayPal’s
rapid ascension was in large part due to an effective “viral marketing” launch strategy,
in which one could send money to any individual, who would then be enticed to open
an account [Jackson (2004)]. PayPal is still not economical for micropayments, how-
ever, and new schemes—most notably, Peppercoin [Micali and Rivest (2002)]—have
emerged aiming to provide such services.
4. Automating market participants
Part of automating markets is automating the behavior of participants in those markets.
Of course, computerized trading has been a reality almost as long as we have had com-
puters. What is relatively new is the proliferation of electronic markets on networks, and
their potential to dramatically expand the opportunities for automating trading functions
in a broad variety of domains. Conversely, automating traders can shape the automation
of markets, for example, by rendering feasible some market designs too complex for
manual traders.
As in most realms of computerization, there is no sharp line between automated
and non-automated trading. Virtually all trading in financial markets is mediated by
computers at some stage of the process, and the same is true by definition for markets
that themselves operate electronically. Consider the communication flow of the generic
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Figure 3. The trading agent interacts with a market mechanism by submitting bids in response to market
information. The process can be automated to varying degrees, depending on the role of the computer in the
process of translating instructions and market information.
trading system diagrammed in Figure 3. The human trader issues “instructions” to the
computer, resulting in bids submitted to the market. The instructions may be direct, for
example, “buy 100 shares XYZ at $20”, in which case the computer is merely serving
a communication interface function, and the trading is essentially manual. To the ex-
tent instructions are indirect, such as “balance my portfolio”, or “liquidate my holdings
in sector S in an orderly manner”, we would characterize the trading as automated to
a correspondingly greater degree. Similarly, to the extent the computer processes the
market information for presentation to the human—summarizing, identifying patterns,
even recommending specific trading actions—we would have to credit the machine with
a share of the overall decision process.
The upshot is that automated trading exists on a continuum, and it is futile to attempt a
precise binary classification of human and computer trading activity. We merely observe
that the computer’s role is often significant, and growing over time in sophistication and
complexity. Of course, the trading is ultimately on behalf of humans (or organizations
operated by and for humans), and so the humans will continue to exert ultimate control
and influence over their trading agents. As the machines prove increasingly worthy of
trust in their competence to execute decreasingly direct instructions, it is inevitable that
a significant fraction of trading activity will become fully automated for all practical
purposes.
Recognizing that overall trading activity is the product of manual and automated
components, we henceforth apply the term “trading agent” to the combined entity inter-
acting with the market, enclosed by the dashed box in Figure 3.
The phenomenon of automated trading raises several interesting questions.
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• How should trading agents behave? How can we design effective strategies for a
range of environments? How can we construct agents capable of incorporating new
information and objectives, and adapting to changing circumstances?
• How will automated traders change the character and behavior of markets? Will
additional stabilization, security, or other safety-related mechanisms be required?
• How can we design markets to cater to or exploit the capabilities of automated
trading agents?
In the sections below we address these questions, in the course of surveying some sig-
nificant threads in trading agent research. Our focus is on works that study the behavior
or potential of trading agents themselves, as opposed to efforts that use computational
agents as a way to model human trading behavior. The latter is the domain of much
research in agent-based computational economics, addressed in several other chapters
of this handbook.
4.1. Program trading
As noted above, automation of trading in financial markets is a well-established practice.
The term “program trading” (or “programmed trading”) is sometimes applied generi-
cally to any initiation of trade activity based on procedural rules (typically implemented
by computer programs), but more frequently refers to a particular form of trading based
on index arbitrage [Brennan and Schwartz (1990)] or other standard portfolio trad-
ing strategies. Index-arbitrage programs monitor the price of index futures contracts
(e.g., for the Standard & Poor’s 500), as well as the basket of underlying securities, and
triggers trades whenever the futures price deviates from the underlying price by some
pre-specified threshold dependent on the interest rate. Academic interest in program
trading focused on the effect of this activity on price volatility, including much inves-
tigation of its relation to the October 1987 stock market crash [Baldauf and Santoni
(1991)].
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) requires its members to report trades in-
volving fifteen or more stocks with aggregate value of a million dollars or more. This
definition is designed to capture the common pattern of program trading for index or
other derivative-based arbitrage, portfolio insurance, and other portfolio-based actions.
According to NYSE, such trades account for a large fraction of overall volume: 51.2%,
for a typical example, in the last week of January 2005. Of this, 11.4% was attributed to
index arbitrage specifically.
It is of course possible to implement any systematic trading strategy in a computer
program, and many such programs have been marketed to investors as “black-box” or
“gray box” trading systems (so-called because their specific trading rules are secret
or only partially revealed). As the availability of financial market data via the Internet
has increased, so have the offerings of software packages providing analysis and mon-
itoring tools, some providing interfaces for user-specified trading rules. Whereas it is
doubtful that retail investors can profit substantially through such means, major broker-
ages reportedly devoted significant resources to computational modeling and automated
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trading strategies for internal use by their trading units. For proprietary reasons, little
is publicly known about the nature and extent of these computerized trading activities.
Bass (1999) presents an unusually forthcoming story of the Prediction Company’s ef-
forts in automated trading, but even this account stops short of technical and strategic
precision.
4.2. Market interfaces
Automated agents interact with electronic markets according to standardized inter-
faces. Program trading in financial markets is facilitated by ECNs (electronic crossing
networks) such as Island and Instinet, which support specified network protocols for
submitting stock orders. The Small Order Execution System provides an analogous
standard interface to Nasdaq market makers.
Online marketplaces inherently provide a window to automated traders, as a side
effect of supporting standard web protocols. For example, eBay cannot necessarily dis-
tinguish a bid submitted by a human user through a browser from one generated by
a program constructing the same web posting. Users have taken advantage of this op-
portunity, for example by employing programs to submit bids at prespecified times,
typically seconds before the scheduled auction close. This practice, called sniping, is
quite common on eBay, and can be supported by several auction-theoretic arguments
[Roth and Ockenfels (2002)]. Services such as eSnipe also provide rudimentary facili-
ties to condition bids on auction events, such as the success or failure of related bids in
specified auction groups.
Definition of a market interface is part of the overall task of market design. Bidding
rules comprise a dimension of market design space, governing the language of allowable
bids as well as the policy for admitting bids over time [Wurman et al. (2001)]. Choice
of a bidding language often entails addressing rich tradeoffs, for example in the com-
plexity of bidding or evaluating bids [Nisan (2000)]. In some cases, a designer might
intentionally restrict bidding rules in order to simplify the interface implementation or
to bias toward simple negotiation strategies [Cranor and Resnick (2000)].
To fully support automated trading, market interfaces would provide machine-
readable specification of bidding rules, as well as other market policies. This would
facilitate deployment and testing of mechanisms, promote transparency, and ultimately
support automatic adaptation of trading strategies. Although sufficiently flexible and
formal standards for specifying markets are not yet available, special-purpose languages
for specifying auctions [Lochner and Wellman (2004)] and reasoning about negotiation
protocols [Guerin and Pitt (2002)] constitute steps in this direction.
4.3. Agent strategies
How a trading agent should behave depends, of course, on the market mechanism and
other agents in its environment. Studies of trading agent strategy typically focus on a
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particular environment; there have been few attempts thus far to distill general cross-
cutting principles. In this section we examine research on strategies for two canonical
market environments: individual continuous double auctions and collections of simul-
taneous auctions. In Section 4.4 we consider a more complex market game combining
several different market mechanisms.
4.3.1. Continuous double auction strategies
One of the most basic trading scenarios is an abstract market based on the continuous
double auction (CDA) mechanism [Friedman (1993)]. The CDA is a simple and well-
studied auction institution, employed commonly in commodity and financial markets.
The “double” in its name refers to the fact that both buyers and sellers submit bids,
and it is “continuous” in the sense that the market clears instantaneously on receipt of
compatible bids.16
The CDA has also been widely employed in experimental economic studies, and
notably in an open research competition conducted at a Santa Fe Institute workshop
in 1990 [Friedman and Rust (1993), Rust et al. (1994)]. The winning trader in this
competition held back until most of the other agents revealed their valuations through
bidding behavior, then “stole the deal” by sniping at an advantageous price. Agents
employing more elaborate reasoning failed to make such sophistication pay off. This
is consistent with observations that even extremely naive strategies—exhibiting what
Gode and Sunder (1993) dubbed “zero intelligence” (ZI)—achieve virtually efficient
outcomes in this environment. Such results suggested a strong limit on the potential
returns to positive smarts.
Over the last fifteen years, CDA markets served as a basis for many further studies of
artificial trading agents. The simplicity and familiarity of the abstract CDA framework
presents some distinct advantages as the basis for trading agent research. These include
ease of explanation and simulation, low barriers to entry, consensus understanding of
market rules, predictability of behavior, opportunity to build on prior work (on design
of both mechanism and agents), and analyzability of outcomes. Given the ubiquity of
the CDA institution, there is even a potential to incorporate real-world market data of
various kinds.
Cliff (1998) provides an extensive bibliography covering much of this work, includ-
ing his own evolutionary studies of “ZI plus” agents. One particularly influential trading
strategy was proposed by Gjerstad and Dickhaut (1998), later revised and termed the
“heuristic belief learning” (HBL) model [Gjerstad (2004)]. An HBL agent maintains a
belief state over acceptance of hypothetical buy or sell offers, constructed from histori-
cal observed frequencies. It then constructs optimal offers with respect to these beliefs
and its underlying valuations. The timing of bid generation is stochastic, controlled by
16 In the computer science literature “continuous” mechanisms are usually called “on-line”; we discussed
some theoretical results for on-line scheduling market design in Section 3.2.1, above.
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a pace parameter, which may depend on absolute time and the agent’s current position.
Gjerstad (2004) demonstrates that pace is a pivotal strategic variable, and that indeed
there is surprisingly large potential advantage to strategic dynamic behavior despite the
eventual convergence to competitive prices and allocations.
In extensive simulated trials, Tesauro and Das (2001) found that a modified version
of HBL outperformed a range of other strategies, including ZI, ZI plus, and the sniping
strategy that won the original Santa Fe tournament. The strategy also compared favor-
ably with human traders [Das et al. (2001)].
Because CDAs or close variants are widely employed in financial markets, models
from the finance literature that account for details of the trading mechanism, or market
microstructure [Garman (1976)], are also highly relevant to trading agent strategy.17
Much of this literature addresses the trading problem from a market maker’s perspec-
tive, explaining price spreads and the potential for dealer profit by way of transaction
costs and inventory management, information asymmetries, or strategic opportunities
[O’Hara (1995)].
Availability of real-time market information has recently begun to enable higher-
fidelity modeling of financial trading environments. The Penn Exchange Simulator
[Kearns and Ortiz (2003)] merges bids from automated trading agents with actual limit-
order streams, providing realistic volume and volatility patterns, whether or not these
would emerge naturally from the artificial agent strategies. Competitions based on this
simulator enabled comparison of a wide variety of CDA bidding policies [Sherstov and
Stone (2004)], including some that may use information from the entire order book
[Kearns and Ortiz (2003)].
4.3.2. Simultaneous ascending auction strategies
A simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) allocates a set of M related goods among N
agents via separate English auctions for each good. Each auction may undergo multiple
rounds of bidding. At any given time, the bid price on good m is βm, defined to be the
highest agent bid max1≤j≤N {bmj } received thus far, or zero if there have been no bids.
To be admissible, a new bid must meet the bid price plus a bid increment (which we
take to be one w.l.o.g.), bmj ≥ βm + 1. If an auction receives multiple admissible bids in
a given round, it admits the highest (breaking ties arbitrarily). An auction is quiescent
when a round passes with no new admissible bids.
The auctions proceed concurrently. When all are simultaneously quiescent, the auc-
tions close and allocate their respective goods per the last admitted bids. Because no
good is committed until all are, an agent’s bidding strategy in one auction cannot be
contingent on the outcome for another. Thus, an agent j desiring a bundle of goods
inherently runs the risk—if it bids at all—that it will purchase some but not all goods
17 Agent-based finance models, as discussed by Hommes (2005) and LeBaron (2005), are primarily directed
at explaining aggregate behavior, but may also prove useful for strategic studies.
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in the bundle. This is the well-known exposure problem, and arises whenever agents
have complementarities among goods allocated through separate markets. The expo-
sure problem is perhaps the pivotal strategic issue in SAAs.
As noted above, dealing with complementarities was a prime motivation for the de-
velopment and exploration of combinatorial auctions in recent years. Although such
mechanisms may provide an effective solution in many cases, there are often signifi-
cant barriers to their application. Most significantly, conducting a combinatorial auction
requires the existence of a competent authority to coordinate the allocation of interde-
pendent resources, and incurs costs and delays associated with such coordination. It is a
simple fact that today we see many markets operating separately, despite apparent strong
complementarities for their respective goods. Whereas automation will very likely in-
crease the prevalence of combinatorial markets, we expect that the issue of trading in
separate dependent markets will remain for the foreseeable future.
Perhaps the most natural baseline for SAAs is a strategy called straightforward bid-
ding (SB).18 A straightforward bidder takes a vector of perceived prices for the goods
as given, and bids those prices for the bundle of goods that would maximize the agent’s
surplus if it were to win all of its bids at those prices.
Let vj (X) denote the value to agent j of obtaining the set of goods X. Given that it
obtains X at prices p, the agent’s surplus is its value less the amount paid, σ(X, p) =
vj (X) − ∑m∈X pm. When agent j is winning the set of goods X−1 in the previous
bidding round, we define the current perceived prices to be p̂m = βm for m ∈ X−1, and
p̂m = βm + 1 otherwise. Then, under SB, agent j bids bmj = p̂m for m ∈ X∗ such that
X∗ = arg maxX σ(X, ̂p).
The straightforward bidding strategy is quite simple, involving no anticipation of
other agents’ strategies. For the single-unit problem, such anticipation is unnecessary,
as the agent would not wish to change its bid even after observing what the other agents
did [Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997)]. This is called the no regret property [Hart and
Mas-Colell (2000)], and means that from the agent’s perspective, no bidding policy
would have been a better response to the other agents’ bids.
For a single-unit value function, the value of a set of goods is just that of its most
valuable included singleton. When all agents have single-unit value, and value every
good equally, the situation is equivalent to a problem in which all buyers have an in-
elastic demand for a single unit of a homogeneous commodity. For this problem, Peters
and Severinov (2001) showed that straightforward bidding is a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium. Up to a discretization error, the allocations from SAAs are efficient when agents
follow straightforward bidding. It can also be shown [Bertsekas (1992), Wellman et al.
(2001a)] that the final price vector will differ from the minimum unique equilibrium
price by at most κ ≡ min(M,N). The value of the allocation, defined to be the sum of
the bidder surpluses, will differ from the optimal by at most κ(1 + κ).
18 We adopt the terminology introduced by Milgrom (2000). The same strategy concept is also referred to as
“myopic best response”, or “myopically optimal”, or even “myoptimal” [Kephart et al. (1998)].
hescom v.2005/11/24 Prn:23/12/2005; 9:40 F:hescom2028.tex; VTEX/Judita p. 32
aid: 2028 pii: S1574-0021(05)02028-9 docsubty: REV












































Unfortunately, the very nice properties for straightforward bidding with single-unit
value do not carry over to multiple-unit problems. Indeed, the resulting price vector
can differ from the minimum equilibrium price vector, and the allocation value can dif-
fer from the optimal, by arbitrarily large amounts [Wellman et al. (2001a)]. However,
whereas the case against SB is quite clear, auction theory [Krishna (2002)] to date has
relatively little to say about how one should bid in simultaneous markets with comple-
mentarities. In fact, determining an optimal strategy even when it is known that other
agents are playing SB turns out to be an unsolved and surprisingly difficult problem,
sensitive to the smallest details of preference distributions [Reeves et al. (2005)].
Our gap in knowledge about SAA strategy is especially striking given the ubiq-
uity of simultaneous auctions in economically significant settings. Indeed, markets for
interdependent goods operating simultaneously and independently represents the nor-
mal or default state of affairs. Even for some markets that are expressly designed,
most famously the US FCC spectrum auctions starting in the mid-1990s [McAfee and
McMillan (1996)], a variant of the SAA is deliberately adopted, despite awareness of
strategic complications [Milgrom (2000)]. Simulation studies of scenarios based on the
FCC auctions shed light on some strategic issues [Csirik et al. (2001)], as have accounts
of some of the strategists involved [Cramton (1995), Weber (1997)], but the general
game is still too complex to admit definitive strategic recommendations.
In our own work, we explored SAA strategies in the context of a simple market-based
scheduling scenario [MacKie-Mason et al. (2004), Reeves et al. (2005)]. In the schedul-
ing game, agents need to complete a job requiring a specified duration of resource, by
acquiring the resource over individual time slots. The value for completing a job de-
pends on when it is finished. Complementarities arise whenever jobs require more than
a single time slot.
We investigated a family of possible strategies for this game, employing an empirical
methodology discussed in some detail in Section 5 below. Our basic approach was to
start with SB as a baseline, and evaluate parametric variations through extensive sim-
ulation and analysis. In particular, we considered two extensions of SB designed to
mitigate the exposure problem. First, we modify SB to account for sunk costs to some
degree, recognizing that goods an agent is already winning will pose no marginal costs
if other agents do not submit additional bids. The strategy is implemented in terms of a
“sunk awareness” parameter ranging over [0,1], with zero treating all winning bids as
sunk costs and one corresponding to unmodified SB. Perhaps it should not be surprising
that the equilibrium settings of this parameter are quite sensitive to the distribution of
agent job characteristics (length, deadline values). We identified qualitatively distinct
equilibria corresponding to different job distributions.
The second alternative we considered attempts to explicitly predict the closing prices
for each slot, and selects bundles based on these price predictions [MacKie-Mason et
al. (2004)]. Our overall finding is that this approach is quite effective compared to SB
or employing a global sunk-awareness parameter. Performance, of course, depends on
the prediction vector employed by the agent, as well as the distribution of job char-
acteristics. Since prices are observable, however, it is perhaps plausible to glean the
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prediction vectors directly from experience (real or simulated). The structure of the pre-
diction methods surviving in equilibrium appear relatively robust to changing the agent
job distributions.
4.4. Case study: trading agent competition
Inspired by success of Santa Fe double auction tournament and other research com-
petitions, a community of trading-agent researchers established an annual competition
event designed to focus effort on a common problem, thus enabling researchers to com-
pare techniques and build on each others’ ideas [Wellman et al. (2001b)]. Working on a
shared problem coordinates attention on particular issues (among the many of interest
in the trading domain), and facilitates communication of methods and results by fixing
a set of assumptions and other environment settings.
The multi-year Trading Agent Competition (TAC) series offers the further prospect
of learning from shared experience over time. As a case study of trading agent research,
we examine the experience of the first four years of TAC, and some of the research
results spawned from that activity. The first TAC was held in 2000, followed by annual
sequels, each attracting approximately twenty participant teams. In 2003, TAC intro-
duced a second game, in the domain of supply chain management [Arunachalam and
Sadeh (2005)], which also produced significant interest and research activity. In this
case study we focus on the original travel-shopping market game.
4.4.1. TAC travel-shopping rules
The TAC travel-shopping market game presents a travel-shopping task, where traders
assemble flights, hotels, and entertainment into trips for a set of eight probabilistically
generated clients. Clients are described by their preferred arrival and departure days, the
premium they are willing to pay to stay at the nicer hotel, and their respective values for
three different types of entertainment events. The agents’ objective is to maximize the
value of trips for their clients, net of expenditures in the markets for travel goods. The
three categories of goods are exchanged through distinct market mechanisms.
Flights. A feasible trip includes round-trip air, which consists of an inflight day i and
outflight day j , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 5. Flights in and out each day are sold independently, at
prices determined by a stochastic process. The initial price for each flight is distributed
uniformly, following a random walk thereafter with an increasingly upward bias.
Hotels. Feasible trips must also include a room in one of the two hotels for each
night of the client’s stay. There are 16 rooms available in each hotel each night, and
these are sold through ascending 16th-price auctions. Agents submit bids for various
quantities, specifying the price offered for each additional unit. Each minute, the hotel
auctions issue quotes, indicating the 16th- (ASK) and 17th-highest (BID) prices among
the currently active unit offers. To ensure ascending prices, hotel bidders are subject
to a “beat-the-quote” rule [Wurman et al. (2001)], requiring that any new bid offer to
purchase at least one unit at a price of ASK +1, and at least as many units at ASK +1 as
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the agent was previously winning at ASK. Also each minute, starting at minute four, one
of the hotel auctions is selected at random to close, with the others remaining active and
open for bids. When the auction closes, the units are allocated to the 16 highest offers,
with all bidders paying the price of the lowest winning offer.
Entertainment. Agents receive an initial random allocation of entertainment tickets
(indexed by type and day), which they may allocate to their own clients or sell to other
agents through CDAs. The entertainment auctions issue BID and ASK quotes represent-
ing the highest outstanding buy and lowest sell offer, respectively, and remain open for
buying and selling throughout the 12-minute game duration.
A feasible client trip is defined by inflight and outflight days, rooms in the same hotel
for all nights in the interim, and a set of entertainment tickets. The client’s utility for this
trip is given by a constant base value, minus penalties for deviating from preferred dates,
plus (if applicable) bonuses for staying in the premium hotel and attending entertain-
ment. At the end of a game instance, the TAC server calculates the optimal allocation of
trips to clients for each agent, given final holdings of flights, hotels, and entertainment.
The agent’s game score is its total client trip utility, minus net expenditures in the TAC
auctions.
4.4.2. TAC experience
As we can see, the TAC travel-shopping game scenario presents a challenging trad-
ing problem, involving multiple interdependent goods allocated over time, through
three distinct market mechanisms. Flights are sold through take-it-or-leave-it offers, ho-
tels through multiunit SAAs (with stochastic termination), and entertainment through
CDAs. Each of these poses open strategic problems.
The TAC record is well documented, including accounts of particular tourna-
ments [Wellman et al. (2001b, 2003b), Lanzi and Strada (2002), Eriksson and Jan-
son (2002)], and summary descriptions of competing agents [Greenwald and Stone
(2001), Greenwald (2003)]. We also investigated behavior across years [Wellman et
al. (2003a)], finding that over time the allocation of travel resources in TAC play has
become increasingly efficient. Since the TAC market appears to be quite competitive
(as discussed below), this provides indirect evidence of general progress in agent per-
formance.
One of the first findings to emerge from TAC was simply that a diverse set of research
groups (ranging from individual students or employees to teams of senior researchers)
were capable of constructing competent agents to play a complex game. By and large,
most participants recognized the key strategic issues, and solved relevant subproblems
accurately. For example, two key subproblems identified and solved by many partic-
ipants were determining the optimal allocation of a given set of goods to clients, and
evaluating the marginal utility of a particular good [Greenwald and Boyan (2001), Stone
et al. (2001)]. Techniques for such core problems are generally disclosed by participants
after the competition, and often incorporated and extended by other entrants in the next
year’s event.
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In some cases, work on challenging TAC problems spurred research on techniques
applicable much more generally in automated reasoning and decision making. For
example, Stone et al. (2003) extended boosting techniques from machine learning to
estimate conditional densities, driven by the pivotal TAC problem of estimating future
hotel prices given current and historical price information, as well as other features.
Sophisticated learning of price distributions was undoubtedly a major ingredient in
the success of ATTac-2001, which finished in a virtual two-way tie for first place in the
2001 TAC tournament. Its precise monitoring and reaction to prices was in stark contrast
with the other first-place agent, livingagents [Fritschi and Dorer (2002)], which imple-
mented a comparatively simple strategy of predicting optimal trips at the beginning and
then taking hotel prices however they turned out. That such open-loop behavior could
work so well was initially surprising. Indeed, if all agents played the livingagents strat-
egy, hotel prices would skyrocket to unprofitable levels. But in the actual tournament,
stabilizing agents like ATTac-2001 were the norm, effectively removing the risk to blind
price-taking behavior.
An interesting lesson from this 2001 outcome was that interactions among the strate-
gies are indeed important in TAC. The success of price-taking in the finalist pool also
suggests that the market was fairly competitive. In the 2002 tournament, Walverine
[Cheng et al. (2005)] took the competitiveness assumption seriously, modeling the TAC
hotel market as a perfectly competitive system. Specifically, Walverine derived the Wal-
rasian equilibrium for hotel prices given the initial flight prices and expected demand
based on the known distribution of client preferences. This proved to be quite accurate as
an initial prediction for hotel prices, performing on par with the sophisticated machine
learning method employed by ATTac-2001 [Stone et al. (2003)], and significantly better
than all other approaches in the TAC-02 finals [Wellman et al. (2004)]. This is perhaps
surprising, given that Walverine was the only agent that did not employ historical data in
its prediction method. Subsequent analysis indicated that a key determinant of success
was taking into account the effect of flight prices on clients’ choices of travel dates (and
therefore hotel demands on different days). This relationship was pivotal in Walverine’s
competitive equilibrium analysis, and was empirically learned by ATTac-2001 as well
as kavayaH [Putchala et al. (2002)], which predicted prices based on a neural-network
model.
Predictions are of course uncertain, and TAC participants have identified several ap-
proaches to using probability distribution information in their bidding strategies. ATTac-
2001 made decisions based on sampling from the price distribution, but its developers
found in subsequent experiments that deciding directly based on distribution means was
more effective [Stone et al. (2003)]. Similar results in the context of other agents were
reported by the developers of RoxyBot and Walverine. Greenwald and Boyan (2004) per-
formed a careful study of the general problem of bidding under uncertainty, comparing
the problem as it arises in TAC to simpler models of purely sequential and simultane-
ous auctions. Hotel auctions in TAC are a hybrid, as agents bid simultaneously in all
of them, after which one closes, and the agents have an opportunity to revise bids in
the rest based on the results. Their study found that TAC hotel auctions strategically re-
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semble simultaneous more than sequential auctions, which suggests that insights from
research on SAAs (Section 4.3.2) may prove applicable to this problem.
Overall, success in TAC requires putting together solutions to the several subprob-
lems comprising the game. The top scorer in the 2002 tournament was whitebear, whose
developers tuned to victory through a process of extensive simulation experiments,
performed systematically over a set of key control parameters [Vetsikas and Selman
(2003)]. The 2003 tournament proved to be the tightest competition yet, with less than
100 points separating the top five agents: ATTac-2001, PackaTAC, whitebear, Thalis, and
UMBCTAC.
5. A computational reasoning methodology for analyzing mechanisms and
strategies
To conduct descriptive and explanatory research, economists traditionally rely heavily
on the specification of stylized models that abstract from many real-world details in or-
der to obtain formal results. One of our themes is that less formalism is reasonable when
economics is practiced as a normative science applied to the design of computational
markets and agents. Implementation details, problem complexity, and context matter in
a fundamental way.
Direct application of analytic (usually game) theory quickly becomes infeasible as
problem complexity grows, as reflected (informally) in size of strategy space, number of
agents, degree of incomplete and imperfect information, and dynamism. Despite recent
advances in game computation [Koller et al. (1996), McKelvey and McLennan (1996),
Kearns et al. (2001), Porter et al. (2004)], even moderate size coupled with uncertainty
and dynamics suffices to place modest but interesting market designs beyond the range
of currently available solution methods.19 As one well-known example, consider the
FCC spectrum auctions. These multi-billion dollar auctions were designed by some
of the best auction theory researchers alive, and major bidders hired most of the rest
of the top auction researchers to help them devise strategies. Yet neither the market or
agent strategy designers were able to analytically solve the game induced by the auction
rules.20 The outlook is more bleak for the numerous other markets that are at least as
complex but less rich with potential gains from analytical solution.
When analytic methods are infeasible, what other tools are available for market and
agent designers? One standard method is to statistically study quasi-experimental ev-
idence from real-world market implementations to test generalizable hypotheses. Of
19 Although the theoretical complexity of various game-computation problems [Conitzer and Sandholm
(2003), Papadimitriou (2001)] is to some extent unsettled, the practical unsolvability of many games of
interest—now and for the foreseeable future—is an uncontroversial proposition.
20 Nor, apparently, did the designers anticipate and prevent certain collusive strategies; see, e.g., Weber
(1997).
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course, for computational market design there are few implementations in the field, es-
pecially if we wish to test new ideas. In this case, a variant is to design markets based
on heuristics when theory is not complete, implement them in the field, and test their
performance. This process, unfortunately is both slow and extremely expensive.
A related approach that has been used from the earliest days of computational market
design is to test implementations in human subject laboratory experiments. Some of the
earliest computational market designers were also among the pioneers of experimental
lab methods in economics; in particular, the economists at the University of Arizona
[Smith (1962)] and the California Institute of Technology [Plott (1986)]. This coinci-
dence is not terribly surprising: to test any market, including non-computational, in a lab
setting, researchers quickly found it expedient to build computational markets so that
the experiment interface and instrumentation could be automated. However, although
laboratory experiments are often more practical than field trials, they are still expensive.
Further, mechanism and strategy complexity is limited by reliance on non-expert human
participants.
We describe an emerging methodology that uses computational experiments to sys-
tematically investigate agent strategies and the performance of market mechanisms. The
method begins with an explicit formulation of the resource allocation problem, and pro-
ceeds through at least five distinct tasks (we elaborate on these and provide references
in the ensuing subsections):
1. Specify a computational mechanism (or several). Designs can be generated from
innovation to existing forms, creative speculation, or through directed search (say,
with a genetic program [Cliff (2003), Phelps et al. (2002)]).
2. Generate candidate strategies. As with mechanisms, candidate strategies can be
generated in several ways. One promising idea is to search systematically or ran-
domly through some encoding of strategy space. Another is to specify a strategy
family parameterized to address important tradeoffs, perhaps based on a previ-
ously studied strategy. In any case, it is necessary to reduce dimensionality by
restricting the strategy space, in order to employ numeric analysis methods.
3. Estimate the “empirical game”. Simulation and sampling converts the extensive
form game of incomplete information into a normal form with expected payoffs
associated with each possible strategy profile.
4. Solve the empirical game. Methods such as replicator dynamics exploit symme-
try or other available structure to efficiently solve large games for their equilibria.
5. Analyze the results. Attempt to extract generalizable regularities, and employ
sensitivity analysis to drive further sampling and search.
These methods are emerging in the work of several authors [Reeves et al. (2005),
MacKie-Mason et al. (2004), Armantier et al. (2003), Kephart and Greenwald (2002),
Walsh et al. (2002)]. They are related in some respects to the generative social science
methods used elsewhere in agent-based research [Epstein (2005)].
In the remainder of this section we discuss most of the main steps in this methodol-
ogy. We do not devote any further attention to the first step of specifying a mechanism:
this was the subject of Section 3 (especially Section 3.2).
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5.1. Generate candidate strategies
One important source of intractability in market mechanisms is the enormousness of
the strategy space. For example, in the market-based scheduling problem we studied,
agent strategies include all functions from preferences (job length and deadline values)
and price-quote histories to current-round bid vectors. The strategy domain includes
all preferences ((M + 1)-dimensional, when there are M time slots), plus all price-
quote histories up to the current time T (MT -dimensional). Partial or full combinatorial
mechanisms have even higher dimensionality. Exploring all possible mappings from an
M(T + 1) to an M dimensional space is clearly not feasible. The traditional approach
is to impose a rationality assumption (usually Bayes–Nash) and solve analytically for
optimal strategies, but as we noted above the problem is not tractable for most complex
mechanisms.
To render computational analysis feasible, the researcher restricts the strategy space
to a manageable set. Typically, the researcher will specify a few “interesting” strategies,
generated by intuition or experience, and analyze their performance against each other.
Selten et al. (1997) implement a strategy generation method first proposed by Selten in
1967: humans play strategies in a laboratory setting to gain experience with the game
and the mechanism, and then program those strategies so the researchers could analyze
them further. In a similar vein, Axelrod (1984) solicited programmed strategies. Another
approach is to implement a directed search strategy, such as a genetic algorithm, to select
candidates from the full strategy space [Miller (1988), Koza (1991), Ünver (2001)].
A different approach for identifying such strategies that we explored is to spec-
ify a reasonable skeletal structure augmented with control parameters addressing key
tradeoffs, and then to vary the parameters. For example, as discussed in Section 4.3.2,
straightforward bidding (SB) is a natural candidate for a baseline strategy in any simul-
taneous ascending auction situation [Milgrom (2000)]. An SB agent determines which
subset of goods (including the null set) would be most profitable at currently avail-
able prices, and places incremental bids on those it is not currently winning. For our
scheduling problem we considered variants of SB that admit deviations from its myopic
behavior. One variant was to introduce a “sunk awareness” parameter to account for
exposure risk when an agent is already high bidder on some but not all slots it needs
to complete its package [Reeves et al. (2005)]. Parameters need not be limited to scalar
quantities. We recently investigated bidding strategies that use explicit price prediction
[MacKie-Mason et al. (2004)], similar to many of the trading agents in the TAC compe-
tition (see Section 4.4). The parameters in this case may be vectors of expected prices,
full belief distributions, or more generally, methods for price prediction that may be
plugged in to the broader bidding strategy.
Although sometimes for a different purpose, many investigations of bidding agents
include simulations of what are essentially restricted strategy profiles [Csirik et al.
(2001), Goldman et al. (2001), Wellman et al. (2003a, 2005), Stone et al. (2001, 2003),
Vetsikas and Selman (2003)].
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5.2. Estimate the “empirical game”
Given a restricted set of candidate strategies, the cross-product of these sets across
agents induces a space of strategy profiles, defining a restricted game. The payoff to
each agent in a given profile is defined as the expected payoff for playing its corre-
sponding strategy, where expectations are taken with respect to the distribution over the
agents’ private information, and any other stochastic factors.
For shorthand, refer to the joint probability function over these random variables as
the type distribution. Given a specification of the type distribution, the expected payoffs
with respect to this distribution can be estimated via sampling. The researcher draws
randomly from the type distribution, and simulates play for a given profile. In the limit,
the sample average payoff vector will approach the true expected payoffs for this profile
if the mild conditions hold to support a weak law of large numbers. We refer to the
mapping of strategy profiles to their estimated payoff vectors as an empirical game. This
mapping has also been termed a heuristic strategy payoff matrix [Walsh et al. (2003)].
For example, we investigated a task-allocation problem in an information-collection
domain [Cheng et al. (2003)]. The game has five agents, and we restricted the agents
to choose among three available strategies (A, B, C). The game is symmetric, which
means that each agent receives the same payoff from a given strategy when it faces a
given profile of strategies played by the other agents (in payoff matrix terms, the matrix
is symmetric). Agent types represent resources and tasks assigned in a particular game
instance. Figure 4 depicts the empirical game matrix. We constructed similar empiri-
Figure 4. Payoff matrix for symmetric game with five agents choosing from strategies A,B,C. Each column
corresponds to a strategy profile: {A,A,A,A,A} through {C,C,C,C,C} in lexicographic order. The j th dot
within a column represents the mean payoff for the j th strategy in the profile. This payoff matrix is based on
over 200 games simulated for each of the 21 distinct profiles. The error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
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cal games for many other scenarios, including several configurations of the scheduling
problem, with varying numbers of agents and strategies.
5.3. Solve the empirical game
With a normal form expression of the empirical game, the next step is to solve for one
or more of the Nash equilibria. Because it is based on a restricted strategy set, a Nash
equilibrium of the empirical game—termed a constrained strategic equilibrium (CSE)
[Armantier et al. (2003)]—does not correspond to an equilibrium of the full original
game (even ignoring sampling error). Moreover, because the strategies already dictate
how agents choose their actions based on private information, the CSE is not even a
Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the game where agents may play any of the strategies
conditional on this private information. For this reason, Walsh et al. (2003) refer to the
derived solution profile as an ex ante Nash equilibrium. In the limit as we relax strategy
restrictions, a CSE converges to a BNE [Armantier et al. (2003)].
There are a variety of tools for finding a CSE in the restricted empirical game. The
state-of-the-art solver for finite games is GAMBIT [McKelvey et al. (1992)]. But GAM-
BIT fails to exploit key structure in many games, such as symmetry. Converting the
compact, symmetric representation of a payoff matrix into the more general form often
renders the problem of finding equilibria intractable. For example, we have had GAM-
BIT fail on games with five agents choosing among five strategies. For this reason, we
used two other solution methods that do exploit symmetry, described below.
In his original exposition of the concept, Nash (1950) suggested an evolutionary in-
terpretation of the Nash equilibrium. We used the related replicator dynamics formalism
[Taylor and Jonker (1978), Schuster and Sigmund (1983)] in service of computing equi-
libria. Friedman (1991) proves that if the probabilities in a mixed strategy are cast as
proportions of a large population of agents playing the corresponding pure strategies,
then an agent population that reaches a fixed point with respect to the replicator dy-
namics will be a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. This definition suggests
an evolutionary algorithm in which population proportions are iteratively updated in
successive generations.
We illustrate this evolutionary process in Figure 5 for a version of our scheduling
game [MacKie-Mason et al. (2004)]. In this particular example, agents in a five-player
game are drawn from a population in which the indicated fractions play one of five
strategies from the set labeled by {16, 17, 18, 19, 20}. These strategy labels refer to a
parameter we call “sunk awareness”; when zero the strategy treats all winning bids as
sunk costs, and when the parameter is one the strategy completely ignores sunk costs.
In the figure, the population is converging to the mixed strategy of playing strategy 16
with probability 0.745, and 17 with probability 0.255. In our experience the replicator
dynamics method converges quickly, however the theory only guarantees convergence
to a Nash equilibrium is the number of generations approaches infinity. We are unaware
of any literature that systematically analyzed the performance of this method for solving
matrix form games.
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Figure 5. Replicator dynamics for a five-strategy version of a scheduling market.
Another solution method for symmetric games characterizes (symmetric) Nash equi-
librium as the global minimum of a function mapping mixed strategies to the reals. For
our experiments, we used an adaptation of a Nelder and Mead (1965) nonlinear function
minimizer developed by Walsh et al. (2002).
Although, in part by exploiting symmetry and using replicator dynamics, we have
been able to solve moderately large games faster and more successfully than GAMBIT,
the problem is still computationally burdensome. The number of strategy profiles in a






we recently studied a problem with five agents and 53 possible strategies, which has
over four million unique strategy profiles to evaluate and hand to a game solving tool to
find the equilibrium strategy set [Osepayshvili et al. (2005)]. We have not come close
to estimating empirically all of the cells in the payoff matrix.
5.4. Analyze the results
Once an equilibrium strategy set is obtained, all of the usual analyses can be performed
(subject to the caveat that the equilibria hold with respect to a restricted set of permis-
sible strategies). For example, the equilibrium strategies can be analyzed to discover
critical features that explain their strategic robustness, or to measure their performance
under various conditions. Or, the equilibrium set can be calculated for each of several
candidate mechanisms, and then the performance of the mechanisms compared under
equilibrium play as part of the design loop to obtain better mechanisms.
As we noted above, fully solving a large game may be infeasible. However, partial
empirical data offers opportunities for analysis as well. For example, in our game with
five agents and 53 possible strategies, we have empirically evaluated only 4916 of the
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more than four million possible strategy profiles (and that only for a single assumed
preference distribution). However, we have been able to establish that a particular strat-
egy, s∗, forms a pure symmetric Nash equilibrium when all five agents play it. We did
this by selectively estimating the payoff submatrix for 53 profiles: one with all agents
playing s∗, and 52 with four agents playing s∗ and one agent unilaterally deviating to an
alternate strategy. None of the deviations was successful, so all-s∗ is a Nash equilibrium
[Osepayshvili et al. (2005)].
5.5. Discussion
The automation of markets and agents that trade in them opens up many new oppor-
tunities in market design and deployment. It also raises many new issues for strategic
analysis: extending attention to challenging new market environments, and accounting
for the wide strategic options available to computational agents. It may seem ironic (par-
ticularly for a chapter in the Handbook of Agent-Based Computational Economics) that
we conclude by sketching a methodology that uses agent-based simulations in service
of game-theoretic analysis. Indeed, many of the works in the agent-based economic lit-
erature [Tesfatsion (2003)] aim expressly to overcome the limitations of overly stylized
analyses of markets abstracted from their microstructure. We share this aim, but empha-
size the possibility of addressing issues of model fidelity without necessarily discarding
the underlying theoretical framework. Computational modeling will likely prove just as
valuable in service of game-theoretic analyses, as it can be as an alternative.
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